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Perishable Goods versus Re-tradable Assets:
A Theoretical Reappraisal of a Fundamental Dichotomy1
Sabiou M. Inoua and Vernon L. Smith2
Chapman University
Abstract. Although various typologies of goods are commonly adopted in economics, one
stood out in market experiment results contrasting market stability and efficiency with
market instability: non-durable, or perishable, goods (Smith, 1962) versus durable retradable assets (Smith et al., 1988; Dickhaut et al., 2012; S. D. Gjerstad et al., 2015). This
dichotomy of goods also proved central for understanding macroeconomic instability more
broadly: about 75% of consumer spending is bought for final consumption, and is a rock of
stability; instability arises from the other 25% re-tradable goods, most prominently, houses
(S. D. Gjerstad & Smith, 2014). In this chapter, we revisit this well-known but
underappreciated dichotomy of goods in the light of our theory of classical competitive
price formation. We also emphasize the fundamental and unifying nature of the concept of
asset re-tradability as a general concept in finance: the concept of asset re-tradability allows
for a simple, transparent, and unified treatment of the no-arbitrage and no-trade theorems
of neoclassical finance.
Keywords: perishable goods, re-tradable assets, market experiments, speculation, no-trade
theorems, no-arbitrage principle, excess volatility, clustered volatility, trend following,
power-law distribution
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1 Stability of perishable final goods: experiments and a classical model
Market experiments conducted mid twentieth century (Chamberlin, 1948; Smith, 1962)
established the stability, efficiency, and robustness of markets for perishable goods under
notably the double-auction market institution (Smith, 1962). These laboratory results are
now well-known (reviewed, e.g., in Plott, 1982; Smith, 1982; Smith & Williams, 1990), have
been replicated many times around the world (Lin et al., 2020), and motivated a few
neoclassical models of price equilibration in double-auction markets (Wilson, 1987;
Friedman, 1991; Cason & Friedman, 1996; S. Gjerstad & Dickhaut, 1998; Anufriev et al.,
2013; Asparouhova et al., 2020).3 Alternatively, if one sacrifices some institutional details for
a general principle, then one can characterize a single-market price mechanism as
convergence to competitive equilibrium defined (more generally than to a market-clearing
price) as a generalized median of traders’ values and costs, treated as primitive concepts,
and as an operational substitute for the utility function, following an old, forgotten, more or
less explicit, deep classical methodological tradition of supply and demand (Inoua & Smith,
2021a, 2022).4 That is, competitive price dynamics is rooted in the minimization of the
following distance function, which measures the total potential surplus available to all
buyers and sellers in a market at any standing transaction price (or equivalently the function
measures the sum of mutually beneficial potential trades available in a market, that are not
yet actualized, at any arbitrary standing price):
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There is also the “zero-intelligence” trader model (Gode & Sunder, 1993).

This approach is based on the old classical view of competition as a collective haggling and bargaining
process, which more or less explicitly is based on reservation prices as a primitive concept in a partialequilibrium context (Inoua & Smith, 2022). (In the general equilibrium context, one replaces the concept of
consumer’s reservation price for a good with consumer wealth, viewed as the maximum the consumer would
be willing to pay for the maximum number of units of all goods needed. We will not here elaborate on this
point of the theory of classical price formation, the subject of ongoing research by the authors.) The minimum
principle was already hinted in the seminal experimental paper in a different form and under a different name,
“the excess-rent hypothesis” (Smith, 1962, Section V).

V ( p)

| v p|
v p

|c p|,

(0.1)
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where the notation means summation of all values v

p and all costs c

p (because only

profitable units will be traded) and p is a standing transaction price. That is, if a transaction
price sequence { pt : t

1,..., T } emerges from the competition of traders (in the sense of

buyer-buyer outbidding, seller-seller underselling, and buyer-seller haggling) then it
corresponds to a non-increasing sequence {V ( pt ) : t

1,..., T } of the potential surplus

function:
V ( pt 1 )

V ( pt ), t

1, 2,..., T .

Figure 1. The Maximum Information Principle (PMI) Illustrated using Lab Data: (a)
supply and demand (value and cost distributions), (b) transaction price dynamics;
(c) potential surplus function V; dynamics of potential surplus function V.5
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Data source: Ikica et al. (2021, "FullMoreB" treatment).

(0.2)

This minimum principle is an informational characterization of a competitive market
because it says that a competitive price, which minimizes the potential surplus function, is a
robust optimal summary of the traders’ valuations. It is informational in the sense that
contract prices publicize value-cost information that, pre-market, is inherently private and
decentralized. Thus, we refer to it as the principle of maximum information (PMI).6
The price stability of a good traded for the satisfaction of its final consumer use-value, as in
Figure 1, contrasts starkly with the prices observed in asset market experiments
demonstrating the occurrence of asset price bubbles (Smith et al., 1988).7 This contrast in
stability arises because consumer goods have value only in use, which governs their market
price. Any good durable enough to re-trade exhibits both a use value and a resale value; if
such a good’s resale price disconnects from its use-value price, the good may trade in a price
bubble that deviates substantially, if unsustainably, from its fundamental use value. In the
next section we articulate a theory of the “excess volatility” of re-tradable goods in terms of
their being bought for the prospect of being resold for capital gains. For example, Figure 2
contrasts No Re-trade with Re-trade, as experimental treatment conditions under the same
supply and demand configuration, demonstrating the effect of Re-trade on the price
stability observed in No-Re-trade.

6

The principle is in fact more transparently stated, in an equivalent manner, in terms of an informational
function a la Shannon (Inoua & Smith, 2021a, 2022).
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For a review of bubble experiments, see Palan (2013).

Figure 2. The maximum information principle and its breakdown in the Presence of Retrade and Excess Liquidity. Standard convergence to competitive equilibrium holds
when No-re-trade is allowed (Treatment “P2-SP1”, Column 2); but stability is lost
(counteracted by speculation) when units can be re-traded (Treatment “P2-RT1), and
the instability is greater when subject had greater cash endowment for Re-trade
(Treatment “P1-RT1”).8

2 Speculation and excess volatility of re-tradable assets9
Consider a re-tradable (durable) asset exchanged in a market in which all the participants
are (long-run) investors, i.e. they trade the asset based on their subjective evaluations {v} of
information on the asset’s fundamental value as reflecting the real economic prospect of
the asset’s issuer, and which is therefore exogenous to the market, namely to the price
dynamics; then the minimum principle says that the competitive asset price is a median of
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Data source: Dickhaut et al. (2012).

For a more detailed exposition of some of the ideas presented briefly in Sections 2 and 3, see Inoua and
Smith (2021b), to appear in the Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance.

the traders’ valuations of the asset. Further, it is then reasonable to expect that a core tenet
of the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970) will hold in the market thus modeled,
because the competitive price will approximate the asset’s real value (as long as the
subjective traders’ valuations are not biased in the aggregate). It is otherwise, however,
when trend-following speculation enters the picture.
Convergence to a fixed equilibrium point is of course at odds with the dynamics of
speculative prices, which are prone to extreme (non-Gaussian) fluctuations. More precisely,
speculative price changes are power-law distributed, as is known since Mandelbrot’s
seminal finding (Fama, 1963; Mandelbrot, 1963b, 1963a; Gopikrishnan et al., 1998; Plerou et
al., 2006; Bouchaud, 2011):10 Thus,
prob{|r| x}

for large x, where r
exponent

C
,
x

(0.3)

p/p is the asset’s percent return (relative price change), the

is typically close to 3, and C is just a normalizing constant. A second universal

regularity (which we do not discuss in greater detail here) is volatility clustering: large price
changes tend to be clustered in time (i.e., small-magnitude price changes tend to be
followed by small-magnitude price changes, and large-magnitude price changes by largemagnitude price changes): formally, while the return process is serially uncorrelated, its
magnitude (or absolute value) is long-range correlated. These empirical regularities have
also been observed in the lab (Plott & Sunder, 1982) and have been closely investigated
experimentally (Kirchler & Huber, 2007, 2009).

10

The notation f ( x )

g( x ) means f ( x )/g( x )

1 as x

.

Figure 3. Power-law and clustered volatility illustrated: General Electric stock. (a)
Price. (b) Return (in percent). (c) Cumulative distribution of volatility in log-log scale,
and a linear fit of the tail, with a slope close to 3; (d) Autocorrelation function of
return, which is almost zero at all lags, while that of volatility is nonzero over a long
range of lags (a phenomenon known as volatility clustering).11
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Data source: Yahoo! Finance. The estimation of the power law in Figure 3 and Figure 4 is based on the
maximum likelihood algorithm developed in Clauset et al. (2009).

Figure 4. Price Volatility in the High-Cash-Re-trade Treatment in Figure 2 (third column,
but here all periods combined for statistical significance of the estimation of the power
law tail exponent).

Figure 5. A Lab asset price volatility.12

While the lab asset price volatility are clearly clustered and fat-tailed (non-Gaussian) upon
graphical inspection, the price series (even when pooled across periods) are typically not
long enough to allow for a fully comfortable statistical analysis of the tails of the price series
(fat tails require a much longer data series for statistical significance than common
distributions).13 Notwithstanding this caveat, we observe that the lab asset price volatility is
typically more extreme than its field counterpart (Figure 3 versus Figure 4 and Figure 5: the
lower the tail exponent

12
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of a power law, the higher the volatility).

Data source: Kirchler and Huber (2009, Market 5).

While it is not unreasonable to pool data across periods for a fixed treatment as the data-generating process
can be reasonably assumed stationarity, it is otherwise, however, for pooling across different treatments when
the parameters change greatly.) Finally, note that volatility clustering cannot be rigorously defined in terms of
an autocorrelation function when the power law exponent is less than or equal to 2, for then the return
process has an infinite-variance process.

There is as yet no consensus among experts as to a canonical explanation of the emergence
of the power law of asset returns (and of volatility clustering), although theoretical models
abound in this field, notably the interesting, if often mathematically intractable, agentbased models (reviewed, e.g., by Lux & Alfarano, 2016). Here we suggest a simple
explanation found in the continuity of the previous characterization of the price mechanism.
The speculator who expects a price increase of the asset, buys; the one who expects a price
drop sells: thus by construction, a speculator’s effective reservation price for a good is his
anticipated future resale price, say p e (or more precisely the minimum between the
anticipated resale price and the maximum amount the speculator could pay for the unit
given the speculator liquidity constraint, an important aspect not discussed here). Thus, the
potential surplus function (0.1) becomes, for a purely speculative market:

V ( p,{ pe })

|p

e

p|.

(0.4)

e

{p }

where we sum over the distribution of traders’ anticipated resale prices. There is no reason
why the speculative version (0.4) of the potential surplus function would be minimized (and
that the market would converge to a fixed competitive equilibrium), for the median
anticipated resale price need not be given if the traders’ expectations are self-reinforcing,
which is the case if speculators follow short-run price trends, as they do in practice. One can
easily show that the price change of an asset traded in a competitive market populated by
trend-following speculators, follows (at a first-order linear approximation) a randomcoefficient autoregressive model (Inoua, 2020; Inoua & Smith, 2021b):

rt

H
h 1

r

ht t h

t

,

(0.5)

where {

ht

} and { t } are random variables. Random-coefficient autoregressive processes

(also known as Kesten processes) are rigorously studied by mathematicians (Kesten, 1973;
Klüppelberg & Pergamenchtchikov, 2004; Buraczewski et al., 2016) and are perhaps the
most natural class of power-law generating processes, where the tail exponent depends on
the distribution of the feedback coefficients {

h

} . But they cannot generate clustered

volatility, which can be explained simply in terms of traders’ reaction to exogenous news
about the economy (Inoua, 2020; Inoua & Smith, 2021b).
Figure 6. A purely speculative asset market model: (a) price; (b) asset return follows a
first-order random-coefficient auto-regressive process.; (c) power-law distribution of
asset return; (d) autocorrelation functions of return and absolute return.

This model of financial volatility rests on assumptions rooted in common practices in finance
(speculation, trend following, reaction to news), which are hard to articulate, however, in a
neoclassical framework owing to the no-trade and no-speculation theorems (Rubinstein,

1975; Milgrom & Stokey, 1982; Tirole, 1982). We show that this inherent limitation of
neoclassical finance can be formulated in terms of the concept of re-tradable asset.

3 Re-tradability and the no-trade and no-arbitrage theorems
An arbitrage-free market, recall, is one in which an asset’s price is the discounted expected
value of the asset’s future payoff:
pt

t

( pt

(0.6)

dt 1 ),

1

where pt and dt are respectively the asset’s price and dividend payoff per unit asset
holding at the closing of period t , and

t

is the discounted expectation operator (where

the discount factor is strictly positive) conditional on available information about price
history and dividend announcement up to the end of period t . The standard no-arbitrage
asset price formula (0.6) is equivalent to a no-re-trade theorem. The argument is simple:
Consider a financial market in which multiple assets can be traded at exogenous, given,
prices p. (From now on, boldface denotes a vector.) For each period t , a trader’s financial
wealth Wt (evaluated at the end of each period t ) is the market value of his asset holdings

Ht , minus his asset purchase cost, plus his resale revenue, plus his dividends received,
during that period: Wt
W0

pt Ht

Ht pt

1

dt Ht , t

1, starting from an initial wealth

p0 H0 (the value of the trader’s initial asset holdings), and

Ht being the traders’

transaction during period t , decided based on available information (up to the end of
period t 1 (just for notational simplicity, we assume by convention that all trades during
period t are to be executed at pt 1 , the prices announced at the closing of period t 1 ). Had
the trader maintained his asset position throughout period t , refraining from re-trading any
unit ( Ht

0), he would enjoy a wealth of Wt*

pt Ht

1

dt Ht 1 . The relative

advantage of re-trading assets over holding one’s position is measured by Rt

Wt

Wt* ,

namely:
Rt

In an arbitrage-free market,

(pt

t

( Rt )

pt

dt )

Ht .

(0.7)

0. 14 Hence no risk-averse expected-utility maximizer

would re-trade any asset holdings in an arbitrage-free market (by Jensen’s inequality). That
the no-arbitrage condition (0.6) has a straightforward formulation in terms of the concept of
re-trade advantage (0.7) offers in fact a natural way of formulating the mathematics of
arbitrage-free markets, whose standard formulation (Ross, 1976; Rubinstein, 1976; Ross,
1978; Harrison & Kreps, 1979; Harrison & Pliska, 1981; Dalang et al., 1990) appeals instead
to the concept of nominal capital gains from a self-financed portfolio.

14

This is true by definition of arbitrage-free market [equation (0.6)] and by the fact that a trader’s decision to

trade during period t is based on information available up to the end of period t

1, so that

Ht is known

(determinate, constant) given information available at the end of period t. (In technical terms, the re-trade
decisions { Ht } form a “predictable process” with respect to information available up to the end of period t.)
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